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“No points of our fundamental law are more difficult than those
involved in this whole subject of appointments.”1
—Attorney General Hugh Legaré
I. INTRODUCTION
For the past 130 years, Congress has alternated between two competing
structural visions of ideal administrative agency design—singleadministrator versus multimember organization. Over time, Congress has
frequently reacted to strong arguments from both sides by approving
various arrangements that conflate the two models, particularly with respect
to the important but often overlooked authority to appoint “inferior
Officers” within multimember agencies. In many cases, the chairmen—
or their equivalent—of these multimember boards and commissions retain
some or all power to select high-ranking agency staff, whereas their fellow
board or commission members have authority over agency rulemaking,
adjudication, and other key functions.2 Although such power-sharing
arrangements may have kept the peace in some sense for many years, recent
events call into question the constitutional integrity of these mixedmanagement models.
Most importantly, on June 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight
Board, a hotly contested 5–4 ruling involving several challenges to the
appointment and removal of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).3 The slip
opinion and Justice Breyer’s accompanying dissent ran over 100 pages,
many of them disputing controversial “for cause” removal standards at
independent agencies.4 But two interesting paragraphs near the end of
the majority opinion have received little attention in subsequent analyses.
These paragraphs settled a fairly novel challenge to the board appointments,
which alleged that they were invalid because they were effective only after
the SEC Chairman obtained the full Commission’s approval, despite the

1. Appointment and Removal of Inspectors of Customs, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 162,
164 (1843).
2. See infra Appendix (listing current appointment models within multimember
federal agencies).
3. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
4. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 08-861, slip op.
(U.S. 2010).
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Constitution’s Appointments Clause, which provides that “the Heads of
Departments” may appoint “inferior Officers” within their agencies.5
In the course of rejecting this particular challenge, the Court set forth
sensible new criteria for identifying the “Head” that is constitutionally
responsible for making appointments of senior staff within a multimember
agency. Namely, the “Head” is generally the person or entity that sets the
agency’s internal policies and has final say over the exercise of the agency’s
rulemaking, adjudicatory, and investigatory powers.6 But upon applying
these standards to the organizational structures of current multimember
agencies, it becomes relatively clear that the constitutional heads of all
of these agencies are their respective boards or commissions, acting jointly.7
This conclusion casts serious doubt upon the constitutionality of a number
of chairman-initiated and chairman-controlled appointment schemes long
provided by statute.
In short, the Court’s reasoning suggests that only the purest forms of
the two competing organizational models will pass constitutional muster:
a full multimember commission or board, acting jointly, must direct all
appointments and removals of subordinate officers, or an agency must be
controlled by a single administrator who likewise directs all appointments
and removals of subordinate officers. The currently popular half-and-half
model whereby multimember agency chairmen control appointments and
removals or have the sole power to initiate those appointments or removals
does not appear to comply with the Appointments Clause, as interpreted by
the Court.
In addition, the Court’s reasoning raises new questions about the
constitutionality of the frequently used “approbation” model, whereby
multimember boards or commissions cannot initiate and may only approve
inferior officer appointments or removals, which must be initiated by
their chairmen. These conclusions could have far-reaching effects if
litigators recognize and begin to rely upon the Supreme Court’s standards
set forth in Free Enterprise Fund.

5. See id. at 3163; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“Congress may by Law
vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper . . . in the Heads of
Departments.”).
6. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163.
7. See id.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT HEAD PROVISION
“The Constitution provides scant detail about federal personnel. It
includes only a few references to officers, consuls, and ministers.”8 With
respect to the appointment of senior federal staff, the relevant portion of
the Appointments Clause provides that “the Congress may by Law vest
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”9
Akhil Amar has described this Department Head provision as “a lastminute, housekeeping item” added at the very end of the Constitutional
Convention in 1787.10 The original Appointments Clause offered at the
convention stated only that “[t]he President . . . shall nominate and by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint . . . all . . . Officers
of the U— S—.”11 But the day before the proposed Constitution was
finalized, Gouverneur Morris proposed additional language providing for
appointments by the “heads of Departments,” which was accepted with
little debate.12 Thus, the Department Head provision represented a “very
late” “concession to efficiency, since the appointment of inferior officers
might be more trouble to the President and Senate than the extra procedural
checks were worth.”13 Chief Justice John Marshall soon minimized the
importance of the Department Head provision, explaining that it was
only “an exception to the general provision” of presidential appointments
added by “the framers of the constitution” to ensure that “they had provided
for all cases of offices.”14
Many years later, Justice Antonin Scalia added a “unitary executive”
spin to the provision, concluding that it was

8. DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE
AGENCIES 66 (1st ed. 2012), available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/ Sourcebook12.pdf
(footnote omitted) (citing S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., THE
FEDERAL EXECUTIVE ESTABLISHMENT: EVOLUTION AND TRENDS (Comm. Print 1980) (report
authored by Ronald C. Moe of the Congressional Research Service); JOHN A. FAIRLIE,
THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 55 (1922); LLOYD
MILTON SHORT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 15, 22, 26 (1923); W. F. WILLOUGHBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MODERN STATES 242 (1919)).
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
10. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV.
647, 668 n.90 (1996).
11. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 498–99 (Max
Farrand ed., 1966) (footnote omitted).
12. Id. at 627–28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory Qualifications
for Federal Officers, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 768 (2008).
14. United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 1213 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747).
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perfectly obvious . . . both from the relative brevity of the discussion this
addition received, and from the content of that discussion, that it was intended
merely to make clear . . . that those officers appointed by the President with
Senate approval could on their own appoint their subordinates, who would, of
course, by chain of command still be under the direct control of the President.15

This idea is especially pertinent with respect to the chairmen of some
multimember agencies, who are appointed directly by the President.16
Others have understood the provision as limiting either senatorial or
executive powers. For example, Hanah Volokh has described the
Department Head provision as a congressional check on the President—
who cannot directly nominate or remove inferior officers appointed by
the heads of departments—as well as a means by which the President
and House of Representatives could act to limit the Senate’s potential
abuse of its confirmation power over senior officials.17 Similarly, Justice
Joseph Story viewed the Department Head provision as a grant of
“discretionary power in congress” that “cannot well be questioned.”18
More recently, the Department of Justice has asserted that the Department
Head provision “helps to ensure accountability for the quality of
appointments and the operation of the Government” by authorizing “a
limited number of publicly known and readily discernible sources of
appointing authority, and also, ultimately, through the threat of
impeachment” and removal by Congress, if department heads abuse their
internal appointment authority.19 Thus, like the rest of the Appointments

15. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 720–21 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
16. See infra Appendix (noting, for example, unilateral presidential control over the
designation of chairmen at the Federal Trade Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
and Securities and Exchange Commission).
17. See Volokh, supra note 13, at 778; see also Presidential Appointment
Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-166, 126 Stat. 1283 (2012)
(eliminating the requirement of Senate confirmation for numerous inferior officer positions
across the government, in recognition of the Senate’s failure to approve nominations in a
timely fashion); S. REP. NO. 112-24, at 1 (2011), reprinted in 2012 U.S.C.C.A.N. 491
(explaining the intent of the 2011 Act).
18. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1529, at 382–84 (1833).
19. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel, to the Gen. Counsels of the Exec. Branch, Officers of the United
States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause 3 (Apr. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/opiniondocs/appointmentsclausev10.pdf.
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Clause, the Department Head provision “reflects more than a ‘frivolous’
concern for ‘etiquette or protocol.’”20
As a result, although the Department Head provision’s phrase “as they
think proper” “plainly gives Congress some discretion to allocate
the appointment power,”21 “it is not ‘within Congress’s power to exempt
federal instrumentalities from the Constitution’s structural requirements.’”22
Therefore, the Supreme Court has consistently held that “all officers of
the United States are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause” and
only properly appointed officers may exercise the enforcement, regulatory,
and other administrative powers vested in a federal agency.23
III. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF MULTIMEMBER
AGENCIES IN AMERICA
The application of the Department Head provision remained completely
uncontroversial during America’s first century. Congress did not create
very many federal agencies, and when it did, it exercised very little
creativity in crafting their leadership structures. In short, essentially all
agencies were led by individual secretaries or administrators operating
alone. Thus, the “Head” of each “Department” was easy to identify—the
Secretary of War was clearly the head of the War Department and could
appoint inferior officers in that agency. Consequently, “the definition of
‘Heads of Departments’ has received much less attention” than other parts
of the Appointments Clause.24
It was not until the 1880s that Congress began to seriously experiment
with another model of agency leadership. In 1883, shortly after President
Garfield’s assassination by a disgruntled man seeking a patronage
appointment, Congress passed the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act.
This Act created a new multimember agency—the three-member U.S. Civil
Service Commission (USCSC), a collegial body that served outside of the
President’s direct chain of command and helped ensure that federal

20. Id. at 1 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)).
21. Memorandum from C. Kevin Marshall, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, to the Gen. Counsel Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Assignment of
Certain Functions Related to Military Appointments 3 (July 28, 2005), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/opiniondocs/militaryappointments.pdf.
22. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, supra note 19, at 2 (quoting The
Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President & Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C. 124,
148 n.70 (1996)).
23. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Recent Case, Administrative Law—Appointments Clause—D.C. Circuit Holds
that the SEC Chairman Is Not the “Head” of the SEC.—Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W.
3431 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (No. 08-861), 122 HARV. L. REV. 2267, 2267 (2009).
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employees would be selected on the basis of merit, without regard to
politics.25 Four years later, apparently pleased with its prior work, Congress
created the five-member Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),26 which
was the first truly “independent” regulatory commission—unlike the
USCSC, the President could not remove its members without cause.
As Jay Bybee observed, the independent, multimember ICC
was built on a new administrative model: Though it seemed to exercise executive
power, the Commission, like Congress, was made collegial in order to offer its
scientific expertise; like the judiciary, the Commission was made largely free
of political pressure or reprisal. What the ICC offered [instead] was informed,
dispassionate decisionmaking.27

Following the ICC’s creation, the apparent success of this new
multimember model apparently began to win over Congress, which soon
created the Federal Reserve Board, Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
Tariff Commission, Water Power Commission, Federal Radio Commission,
Federal Power Commission, and Federal Home Loan Bank Board, all
before President Franklin Roosevelt’s election in 1932.28
Fifty years after the creation of the USCSC, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) was first to confront the new constitutional issue of appointments
within these apparently multiheaded agencies. In 1933, Acting Attorney
General J. Crawford Biggs recognized that “the three Commissioners, who
constitute the [Civil Service] Commission, are the ‘head of a Department’
in the constitutional sense” and are therefore entitled to appoint a Chief
Examiner and other “bureau officers, who are themselves the mere aids
and subordinates of the heads of the departments.”29 Thus, the DOJ has
long recognized that the members of a commission or board could jointly
act as head of a department and appoint inferior officers to serve under
them.

25. See Pendleton Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
26. See Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 383 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
27. Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, ALJ Independence, and Administrative Courts:
The Recent Changes in Louisiana’s Administrative Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REV. 431,
438 (1999) (footnoted omitted).
28. See id.
29. Auth. of Civil Serv. Comm’n To Appoint a Chief Exam’r, 37 Op. Att’y Gen.
227, 230, 231 (1933) (quoting United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1878))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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The first five years of President Roosevelt’s New Deal quickly resulted in
even more multimember agencies, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Farm Credit Administration, Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), SEC, National Labor Relations Board, Bituminous
Coal Commission, Federal Maritime Administration, and Civil Aeronautics
Board.30 However, President Roosevelt soon grew frustrated with
the actions of some Republican holdover members of the preexisting
multimember agencies. His frustration only grew following a landmark
Supreme Court decision, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, in which
the Court blocked the President from firing a Republican FTC
Commissioner over policy disagreements.31 Roosevelt then organized a
special Committee on Administrative Management—the Brownlow
Committee—which unsurprisingly concluded that “[f]or purposes of
management, boards and commissions have turned out to be failures.”32
As all presidents realized in the wake of Humphrey’s Executor,
multimember agencies necessarily “limit the President’s influence by
increasing the number of actors the President . . . must influence to direct
agency policy.”33 At the same time, Congress learned the same lesson. It
retains more influence over boards or commissions composed of multiple
Senate-confirmed individuals—who may leak politically important agency
information and otherwise compete to win congressional favor—than it
has over administrators dependent on the President for their authority.
Predictably, subsequent studies have shown that “[w]hen members of
Congress fear the administrative influence of the current President . . . ,
they are more likely to create independent commissions to implement their
policies,” whereas presidents conversely “see themselves as heads of the
regulatory state and fight tooth and nail to resist congressional delegations
to independent agencies.”34
After President Roosevelt’s experience, subsequent presidents continued
to fight to gain more control over multimember agency decisions—a key
rationale motivating their very creation. Shortly after taking over from
Roosevelt, President Truman began efforts “to centralize day-to-day
direction and internal administration of [each multimember] agency in the

30. Bybee, supra note 27, at 438.
31. See 295 U.S. 602, 618, 628–32 (1935).
32. PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES
OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 32 (1937).
33. LEWIS & SELIN, supra note 8, at 99.
34. Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization
and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 464, 466 (2008).
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chairman’s hands in order to prevent . . . ‘splintered management.’”35 First,
during Truman’s Administration, a U.S. government task force conducted a
comprehensive study of these multimember regulatory agencies on behalf
of a congressionally mandated commission led by former President Herbert
Hoover.36 The task force agreed with Roosevelt’s Brownlow Committee
that it was “very difficult for five or more commissioners to direct the work
of the bureaus, or for the bureau chief to report to five or more masters” and
therefore recommended, “the chairman should be specifically designated as
the person responsible for administration within the commission.”37
However, that same task force report advised that “the chairman’s primary
responsibility for administration should not supplant the ultimate authority
of the entire commission on matters which are of major significance to
the agency. For example, the commission should approve appointments
of bureau or division chiefs, or major reorganizations of the staff.”38
Shortly after receiving the Hoover Commission’s task force report,
President Truman convinced Congress to pass the Reorganization Act of
1949, which streamlined the process by which presidents could reorganize
federal agencies.39 Most importantly, the Reorganization Act allowed
presidents to reorganize multimember agencies by consolidating powers
in the agencies’ chairmen—who would generally be selected by the
President himself—which led Senator Edwin Johnson, a fellow Democrat,
to complain that Truman wanted “one-man agencies” subject to direct
presidential control.40 However, reorganization remained—and remains—
subject to congressional approval, and the Act contained one key provision
regarding the identification and appointment of agency heads. That
provision recognized that a “reorganization plan transmitted by the
President [under] this section may provide that the head of an agency be
35. Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and
Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1168 (2000) (quoting
MARVIN H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 173 (1955)).
36. See Commission on Organization of Executive Branch of the Government,
Pub. L. No. 80-162, 61 Stat. 246 (1947).
37. C OMM ’ N ON O RG . OF THE E XEC . B RANCH OF THE G OV ’ T , C OMMITTEE ON
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 44, 46
(1949).
38. Id. at 47.
39. See Pub. L. No. 81-109, 63 Stat. 203 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 901–913
(2012)).
40. Daniel E. Ho, Measuring Agency Preferences: Experts, Voting, and the Power
of Chairs, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 359 (2010) (quoting Senate Kills ICC and FCC
Revamping, WASH. POST, May 18, 1950, at A1) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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an individual or a commission or board with more than one member”
and “[i]n the case of an appointment of the head of such an agency, . . . [the
appointment] shall be by the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate.”41 As explained in Part V of this Article, that statute’s
significance became clear with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Free Enterprise Fund.42
Eleven years after Congress passed the Reorganization Act, James M.
Landis encouraged President-elect Kennedy to “make clear that the
[presidentially selected] Chairman’s authority extends to all administrative
matters within the agency, including . . . the appointment of . . . personnel,
except . . . division heads whose appointment must be confirmed by a
majority of the agency members.”43 And in fact, since the mid-twentieth
century, there has been a notable increase in the number of politically
appointed middle managers within federal agencies.44
In sum, “[o]ver the years a variety of presidentially inspired
reorganization plans have transferred powers over [multimember] agencies’
budget, hiring and priority-setting to the Chair, who is usually subject to
appointment by the President,” leading Paul Verkuil to question “whether
centralizing power in the office of the Chair is not an attempt to make
collegial agencies something they are not—single-headed agencies” that
answer to the President on all important matters.45
IV. CHAIRMEN’S USE OF APPOINTMENT AUTHORITY WITHIN
MULTIMEMBER AGENCIES
Marshall Breger and Gary Edles concluded that without a doubt, “the
chair of a multi-member agency is ordinarily its most dominant figure”
because of the reforms authorized under the Reorganization Act.46
Similarly, Jay Bybee noted that when it comes to administrative agency
design, “[s]tructure matters,”47 and in particular, for Daniel Ho,
presidentially appointed “chairs matter” within multimember agencies,
especially given their supervisory authority over staff within their
agencies. 48 Peter Strauss, a former general counsel in an independent,

41. 5 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).
42. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
43. JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
85 (1960).
44. LEWIS & SELIN, supra note 8, at 67–68.
45. Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 257, 265, 266 (footnote omitted).
46. Breger & Edles, supra note 35, at 1164.
47. Bybee, supra note 27, at 431.
48. Ho, supra note 40, at 358, 360.
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multimember agency—the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)—
agreed that vesting multimember agency chairmen with the ability to select
senior agency staff mattered, especially to the extent that it naturally
resulted in them “commanding staff loyalties,” which helps the chairmen
“dominate commission policymaking.”49 In such cases, “[t]he chairman
usually gets what he wants.”50
And notwithstanding the limits of a chairman’s actual authority within
a multimember agency, David Welborn noted that because of their
power over personnel decisions and their ability “to name bureau chiefs
who share the[ir] philosophy,” chairmen are often perceived by agency
employees as being “more potent sources of influence over staff activity
than other members, individually or collectively.”51 Thus, several agency
staff members confided that their “Bureau directors will do anything the
chairman wants” and that those senior officials “think of the chairman as
the ‘head of the agency,’” because they are at least partially “dependent on
the good will of the chairman” for their offices.52
In fact, some agency chairmen have even “actively discouraged close
relationships between [their fellow] commissioners and staff.”53 As a
result, lower-level staff members seeking promotions are naturally “quite
sensitive to the views of chairmen. . . . ‘Staff tr[y] to sniff the water
concerning the chairman’s preferences, and they will respond to them.’”54
This works both ways, as agency staff members’ receptivity to their
chairmen allows the chairmen to maintain “numerous linkages with staff
that allow them ‘to keep in touch with what is going on’ . . . and
that provide access to key determinations made at the staff level.”55
“Inevitably many of the working relationships between chairmen and
staff members are such that other commissioners are not involved or even
aware of them,”56 and the other commissioners or board members generally
stay out of the personnel and staffing determinations, even though these

49. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 591 (1984).
50. DAVID M. WELBORN, GOVERNANCE OF FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 34
(1977) (internal quotations omitted).
51. Id. at 90, 94 (internal quotations omitted).
52. Id. at 94, 96 (internal quotations omitted).
53. Id. at 100.
54. Id. at 91.
55. Id. at 94.
56. Id. at 103.
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decisions “may have a great impact on their agencies.”57 For example,
ongoing meddling in staff attorney hiring by one FTC Chairman was
labeled “a major source of agency difficulties,” and his immediate successor
spent “a considerable portion of his time” reforming those recruitment
policies and overseeing the replacement of over 750 staff members, leading
to “[s]ignificant changes . . . in the manner in which the commission
performed.”58
Although Welborn completed his study in the 1970s, there is little
evidence that things have changed over time. For example, during only
four years in office, one of President Clinton’s FCC Chairmen hired
approximately 200 new staff members—about ten percent of the agency’s
workforce at the time, including fifty percent of its policymaking staff.59
These appointments are “especially important” because these high-level
staffers “shape critical regulatory choices in important and direct ways.”60
In fact, another former FCC Commissioner agreed that “the FCC’s
chairman and a handful of staff—usually selected by the chair—can and
usually do exercise nearly total control over that agency’s basic policy
agenda.”61
History suggests that this authority is not just a theoretical concern and
that it has led to other troublesome abuses of chairmen’s personnel powers
in purportedly “collegial” multimember agencies. A good example would
be the controversial reign of former FTC Chairman Paul Rand Dixon
throughout the 1960s.
One of President Truman’s Reorganization Plans, passed under the
Reorganization Act, provided that the FTC Chairman could appoint almost
all staff at the agency, with the standard exception for “the heads of major
administrative units,” whose chairman-initiated appointments had to be
approved by the full Commission.62 Then-FTC Commissioner Philip Elman
clashed with Chairman Dixon regarding the interpretation of this language.
Elman argued that the “purpose of this provision, which applies to several
of the independent regulatory agencies, was obviously to prevent the

57.
58.
59.

Id. at 53.
Id. at 53–54.
See R EED E. H UNDT , Y OU S AY Y OU WANT A R EVOLUTION : A S TORY OF
I NFORMATION AGE POLITICS 69 (2000).
60. WELBORN, supra note 50, at 54.
61. Glen O. Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive
Prerogative, 1988 DUKE L.J. 238, 245 n.24; see also Breger & Edles, supra note 35, at
1177–78 (noting that because chairmen are generally handpicked by the President, their
“combination of political prestige and managerial authority” can give them “the power to
dominate and control their agencies’ agendas”).
62. See Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3175 (Mar. 13 1950),
reprinted in 64 Stat. 1264 (1950).
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agencies from being staffed by cronies, incompetents, or political hacks.”63
Elman complained of “all these [Dixon-appointed] directors and division
chiefs, all these political hacks” occupying key positions, who were difficult
to navigate around or remove.64 Elman’s ally, Commissioner Mary
Gardiner Jones, agreed and explained that
we wanted to have some control over appointments of the senior staff, because
that’s where the Chairman has so much power and the Commissioners really have
almost none. That’s where all the decisions are made and that’s how policy is
made. The only role left [for individual Commissioners] is to write dissents
and give speeches or talk to the press or whatever. But it’s that control over
appointments that to my mind was critical to influencing the Commission’s
direction.65

Chairman Dixon also recognized the value of this appointment power.
In later testimony before Congress, while referring to the FTC Chairman’s
ability to control agency staff, he admitted that the “Chairman has got
them all by the ‘nape of the neck,’ don’t let anybody kid you that he
doesn’t.”66 In a private interview, Dixon also admitted that he
intended fully to see to it that the so-called Schedule C jobs—these were the
principal policy jobs of these bureaus—were going to be filled by Democrats. I
was going to pick them, and they were going to be my people . . . . I’ll tell you, a
staff has a lot of influence upon these agencies.67

Dixon noted that in “over eight years . . . I hired several hundred people. I
made some mistakes, but a surprisingly small number.”68 Then, responding
to Commissioner Elman’s charges of cronyism, which included allegations
that Chairman Dixon had illegally solicited political contributions from
staff members that he had appointed,69 Dixon replied rather evasively
63. Philip Elman, Administrative Reform of the Federal Trade Commission, 59 GEO.
L.J. 777, 857 (1971).
64. See NORMAN I. SILBER, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: THE LIFE OF PHILIP ELMAN
369 (2004).
65. Interview with Mary Gardiner Jones, FTC Comm’r 1964–1973 (Oct. 9 & 24,
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history/oral-histories/oral-histories/
oral-history-interview-mary-gardiner-jones.
66. Recent Efforts To Amend or Repeal the Robinson-Patman Act—Part 3: Hearings
Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Antitrust, the Robinson-Patman Act, and Related Matters of
the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 94th Cong. 95 (1976) (statement of Paul Rand Dixon, Acting
Chairman, FTC).
67. Interview with Paul Rand Dixon, FTC Chairman 1961–1969, in D.C. (Aug. 7,
1968), available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKOH-PRD-01.aspx.
68. Id.
69. SILBER, supra note 64, at 333.
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that “some of my new commissioners around here thin[k]—Elman, for
instance, thinks that there’s a lot of political bums around here, but he’s
an arrogant goddamned fellow anyway. . . . I’m not so damn, sure, though,
that it wouldn’t run better if it was a political haven.”70
Even though Elman was eventually able to cobble together a bare
majority of the Commission to “call[] the shots on anything that called
for commission action,” he complained that the Chairman “was still running
the commission, appointing staff people and so on. We made an effort to
require him to obtain commission approval in certain personnel matters,
but we didn’t succeed.”71 In fact, despite a decisive 3–1 Commission vote
to add sixty-five key staff positions to the list of “heads of major
administrative units” whose appointment required Commission approval,
Chairman Dixon—the sole dissenter—allegedly “announced that he would
not carry out the Commission’s mandate, which he deemed ‘illegal.’
True to his word, he [thereafter] avoided the thrust of the Commission’s
action by [unilaterally] making ‘acting’ appointments to fill vacancies”
despite the absence of any clear legal authority to do so.72
As Commissioner Jones later explained, Chairman Dixon simply “wasn’t
going to allow” the Commission to seriously influence the selection of
senior staff, and “[n]o Chairman is going to allow it because that’s the way
they impress their own personalities and beliefs on Commission policy
and practice. . . . It probably was a losing battle, but it was critical because
it was so hard to get past the staff.”73
A subsequent outside study agreed that the FTC Chairman “can
manipulate outcomes through his control of appointments . . . . While
major appointments . . . are subject to full commission approval, there is
little doubt among the commissioners that the nominees are the chairman’s
people.”74 Moreover, “[t]hat the bureau director should take his marching
orders from the chairman rather than from the other commissioners
is understandable. Without the support of the chairman, he would never
have been chosen bureau director” because he would never have been
nominated by the chairman.75
Somewhat disturbingly, former Commissioner Elman implied that after
he challenged Chairman Dixon’s authority, the Chairman retaliated by
directing the agency’s chief press officer, who was appointed by the

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Interview with Paul Rand Dixon, supra note 67.
SILBER, supra note 64, at 362.
Elman, supra note 63, at 857–58 n.241 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Interview with Mary Gardiner Jones, supra note 65.
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 87–88 (1980).
75. Id. at 88.
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Chairman, not to distribute copies of Elman’s speeches to the press, despite
his commonly understood duty to do so.76 And when the next chairman
arrived at the FTC, he used his considerable appointment power “to
reorganize the commission,” which “enabled [him] to move a lot of staff
people into other jobs, perhaps not as cushy, but he didn’t fire anybody;
he just moved them aside.”77
These battles and displays of chairman power over agency staff were
certainly not unique to the FTC and have continued at other agencies up
to the present. For example, with respect to the use or misuse of the
chairman’s authority over an agency’s press office, a 2011 congressional
inquiry charged that the NRC’s Director of Public Affairs—directly
appointed and controlled by the Chairman—had “emailed reporters
urging them to read an outside report that denigrated the [other] four
commissioners and criticized them for not supporting [the Chairman’s]
proposals.”78 Likewise, an Inspector General report concluded that, similar
to Chairman Dixon, former NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko sometimes
ignored the Commission majority’s expressed will and “instructed the
Secretary of the Commission not to follow the consensus approach of the
[other] four Commissioners.”79 The NRC also went over six months with a
chairman-appointed “Acting” General Counsel after then-Chairman Jaczko
apparently refused to nominate a permanent General Counsel who was

76. See SILBER, supra note 64, at 331.
77. Id. at 369.
78. Letter from House Comm. on Energy and Commerce to Gregory B. Jaczko,
Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n 4 (Apr. 27, 2012), available at http://energy
commerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/letters/20120427NR
C.pdf.
79. See O FFICE OF THE I NSPECTOR G EN ., U.S. N UCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N,
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT: POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF THE REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 1 OF 1980
AND NRC’S INTERNAL COMMISSION PROCEDURES BY NRC CHAIRMAN 79 (2012), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Hearings
/Joint/20120724_EE_EP/HMTG-112-HHRG-IF18-IF03-20120724-SD002.pdf; see also id.
at 85, 86 (“Commissioner Ostendorff expressed his view that the Chairman attempts to
conduct business as a single administrator rather than the head of a Commission, and
seeks to override majorities of Commissioners by dint of his position as Chairman. . . . One
executive . . . recalled that the Chairman [once said] ‘You’re on my team. . . . I work with the
Commission. You shouldn’t work with the Commission.’”); id. at 94 (stating that the
Chairman instructed senior officials reporting to him that they must work through him
and not provide other Commissioners with information).
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acceptable to the Commission majority and instead left that task to the
next chairman.80
Similarly, a 2008 congressional investigation noted that recent former
FCC Chairman Kevin Martin had, like the former FTC Chairmen, used
and abused his executive and supervisory authorities over agency staff to
immediately and unilaterally reassign or “demote” a number of senior
agency officials without technically removing them or reducing their pay,
which would have required the approval of the Commission majority.81
This obvious loophole exists in almost all multimember agencies
and drastically weakens various multimember commissions’ and boards’
supposedly shared authority over the placement of inferior officers, leaving
the agencies ripe for domination and agenda control by chairmen, including
those who fail to command a majority in regular policymaking endeavors.
On the other hand, this is not to say that chairmen always come out
victorious in their attempts to completely dominate the selection of agency
staff. For example, in 1999, the Chairman of the Chemical Safety and
Hazard Investigation Board announced that hiring personnel was, in his
opinion, an administrative function within his sole authority at the agency82
despite legislative history that undermined his claim. However, the board
resisted his power grab—with the support of some influential Senators
and the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel—and the Chairman eventually
backed down.83
Perhaps unsurprisingly, a recent study by Daniel Ho concluded that
historically, these attempted power grabs are “the rule, not the exception” in
multimember agencies.84 Clearly, this is not ideal and cannot be the most
legally and politically sensible or viable structure for organizing a federal
agency.
As a result, Congress and sitting members of multimember agencies have
continually debated the consolidation of multimember agency authority
in presidentially selected chairmen, and those chairmen have often eagerly
supported presidential efforts to increase their power. As early as 1954,
one commissioner alleged that some politicians sought to transform

80. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n,
Margaret M. Doane Named NRC General Counsel (Oct. 11, 2012), available at http://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2012/12-111.pdf (noting that the prior
general counsel retired on March 31, 2012).
81. See MAJORITY STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 110TH CONG.,
DECEPTION AND DISTRUST: THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION UNDER CHAIRMAN
KEVIN J. MARTIN 20 (2008).
82. Guy Gugliotta, Chemical Hazards Board and Chief a Volatile Mix, WASH.
POST, Nov. 24, 1999, at A21.
83. See Breger & Edles, supra note 35, at 1179–80.
84. Ho, supra note 40, at 360.
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multimember agencies from panels of essentially equal partners to entities
led by “a Chairman and four junior-grade Commissioners” who would
essentially function only as advisers to the chairman.85 These charges are
not necessarily inaccurate.
In the 1970s, one agency chairman told David Welborn that “[a]ll
commissioners are equal, but the chairman is more equal than others.”86
Likewise, recent Chairman Neil McPhie of the Merit Systems Protection
Board openly expressed his desire for even more power at his agency,
announcing his view that “as chairman, he occupies ‘a position of
responsibility that is superior and not co-equal to that of the other two
Board members,’ and that he is [or should be] ‘the head of the agency.’”87
In essence, Chairman McPhie was asking Congress to convert his
agency into the single-administrator model, as some scholars88 and even
commissioners89 have recommended in the past. In fact, going back to
Alexander Hamilton, many have inveighed against the evils of a “plurality
in the executive” with respect to “the appointment to offices.”90

85. S. 3323 and H.R. 8862, To Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946: Hearings
Before the J. Comm. on Atomic Energy, 83d Cong. 851–52 (1954) (statement of Eugene
M. Zuckert, Comm’r, Atomic Energy Comm’n) (criticizing proposals supported by the
Atomic Energy Commission’s Chairman to describe the Chairman as that agency’s “principal
officer”).
86. WELBORN, supra note 50, at 91 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Ensuring a Merit-Based Employment System: An Examination of the Merit
Systems Protection Board and the Office of Special Counsel: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Fed. Workforce Postal Serv., and the D.C. of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform, 110th Cong. 60 (2007) [hereinafter Ensuring a Merit-Based Employment System]
(statement of Morton Rosenberg, Senior Analyst, Cong. Research Serv.) (quoting
Safeguarding the Merit Systems Principles: A Review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board and the Office of Special Counsel: Hearing Before the Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt.,
the Fed. Workforce, & the Dist. D.C. Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 101, 103 (2007) (statement of Neil McPhie, Chairman,
U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.)).
88. See, e.g., JOHN G. KEMENY ET AL., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON
THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND 21–22 (1979) (recommending replacing the NRC’s
“highly compartmentalized” “huge bureaucracy under the commissioners” with a more
streamlined agency “headed by a single administrator, who is in every sense chief executive
officer”), available at http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads/188.pdf.
89. See, e.g., Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission):
Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 96th Cong. 39 (1980)
[hereinafter Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980] (statement of John F. Ahearne, Chairman,
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n).
90. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 474, 477 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (concerning the executive department).
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As former Representative Frank Horton noted in 1980, “One school of
thought wants to eliminate the Commission completely and replace it with a
single administrator. This does, of course, have great appeal from an
economic and efficiency viewpoint.”91 On the other hand, Representative
Horton admitted that with respect to multimember regulatory agencies, “it
might be best to have many viewpoints with a diversity of opinion. . . .
[I]nherent in a collegiality body. . . . [F]or the very important duties of
[setting] policy and rulemaking.”92 At the same time, an executive from
President Carter’s Office of Management and Budget agreed that singleadministrator rule can “narrow the diversity of viewpoints and reduce
safeguards against unwise decisions.”93 Moreover, he noted that Congress
agreed that a collegial structure was preferable and had chosen to form
multimember agencies rather than continuing the historical model of
single-administrator agencies.94
Even more recently, at least one branch of Congress has tried to swing
the pendulum back toward the old multimember format, at least with
respect to one powerful new agency. Since 2010, the Republican-controlled
House of Representatives has repeatedly sought to change the leadership
structure of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau from a single
director to a commission, “like . . . other federal agencies.”95 The ideal
bureau, according to the House, would include a chairman who “would
fulfill the executive and administrative functions of [the agency but whose]
discretion would be bounded by policies set by the whole Commission.”96
Such a structure would “promote sound, stable policymaking” and
ensure[] that multiple perspectives are brought to bear on decisions . . . , and that
different points of view will be considered . . . . [T]he commission structure offers
more stability, ensures continuity in knowledge, provides for the continuous
presence of experienced members at all times, and prevents gaps in agency
effectiveness. Moreover, a commission structure promotes predictability
in rulemaking by preventing a new [single administrator] from unilaterally and
abruptly reversing the decisions made by a previous [single administrator].97

91. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980, supra note 89, at 17 (statement of Rep. Frank
Horton).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 21 (statement of Harrison Wellford, Executive Associate Director, Office of
Mgmt. & Budget).
94. Id. at 33.
95. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-107, at 4–5 (2011).
96. Id. at 5.
97. Id.
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Representative Spencer Bachus, the Chairman of the House Committee
on Financial Services, concluded that “[t]his is a structure that has worked
well for nearly every other regulatory body in this country.”98
Yet despite the political battles, there have been few constitutional
arguments about the competing models of internal agency appointments.
After the initial wave of agency reorganizations in the 1950s and 1960s,
the General Accounting Office—part of Congress99—advised the ICC
that it could not require the agency’s bureau chiefs to report directly to
commissioners other than the chairman, in light of the chairman’s executive
and administrative authorities.100 But much more recently, the
Congressional Research Service concluded that it “is well established
that chairpersons are not the heads of Federal collegial bodies . . . . [T]he
chairman of no . . . multi-member independent agency is in any constitutional
or legal sense the ‘head’ of such a collegial body.”101
Similarly, since its initial opinions concerning the USCSC’s joint
appointment of inferior officers, the DOJ has issued several “opinions
addressing governance issues raised by multi-member boards and
commissions” and has “repeatedly recognized that basic and well-established
principles of corporate common law make clear ‘that the basic premise
governing deliberative bodies is that the majority rules.’”102 Thus, although
many multimember agency chairmen are described as their agency’s
“chief executive,”103 it is clear that “CEOs and presidents of corporations,
as a matter of corporate common law, are ‘subordinate in legal authority’

98. Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., Chairman Bachus Comments on
Legal Challenge to Dodd-Frank Act (June 21, 2012), available at http://financial services.
house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=300403.
99. See LEWIS & SELIN, supra note 8, at 9.
100. Letter from Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller Gen., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office,
to George M. Stafford, Chairman, Interstate Commerce Comm’n (July 25, 1974).
101. Ensuring a Merit-Based Employment System, supra note 87, at 60, 86.
102. Div. of Powers & Responsibilities Between the Chairperson of the Chem.
Safety & Hazard Investigation Bd. & the Bd. as a Whole, 24 Op. O.L.C. 102, 105 (2000)
(quoting Letter from Larry L. Sims, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Mason H. Rose V, Chairperson, U.S. Architectural & Transp. Barriers
Compliance Bd. 2 (Sept. 17, 1981)).
103. See Recent Case, supra note 24, at 2272 (quoting The Investor’s Advocate: How
the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation,
U.S. S EC . & E XCHANGE C OMMISSION , http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#.Uypf
OvldUYI (last visited Apr. 25, 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to their corporations’ boards of directors,”104 and thus these chairmen
presumably are—or should be—subordinate to the full commission or
board.
However, the Supreme Court never directly confronted the thorny issue
of appointment authorities at multimember agencies until 2010, when it
considered Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight
Board.105
V. FREE ENTERPRISE FUND V. PUBLIC CO. ACCOUNTING
OVERSIGHT BOARD
In 2006, the nonprofit Free Enterprise Fund and one of its members, a
Nevada accounting firm, brought a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia, alleging, among other things, that the members
of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board—created by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002—had been unconstitutionally appointed by
the SEC, which had approved nominations initiated by the Chairman of
the SEC. 106 The Free Enterprise Fund argued that a number of
circumstances made these appointments unconstitutional, but for the
purposes of this Article, its most pertinent claim alleged that the
Commission acting collectively was not the head of the SEC for purposes of
the Appointments Clause and therefore could not appoint, or approve the
appointment of, inferior officers, such as the board members.107 Instead,
the fund argued that the SEC’s Chairman must have sole authority over
such appointments.108
Although the district court did not reach the merits of this challenge,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit did. The Court of Appeals
split on other questions, but the panel unanimously concluded that the
Commission-at-large, rather than the Chairman of the agency, properly
functioned as the head of the SEC for purposes of the Appointments
Clause.109
Some scholars quickly criticized this decision, arguing that “vesting
the appointment power in the multimember Commission violates the

104. Div. of Powers & Responsibilities Between the Chairperson of the Chem. Safety
& Hazard Investigation Bd. & the Bd. as a Whole, supra note 102, at 107 (quoting WILLIAM
J. GRANGE, CORPORATION LAW FOR OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: A GUIDE TO CORRECT
PROCEDURE 450 (1935)).
105. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
106. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667,
669–70 (D.C. Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
107. Id. at 672.
108. See id. at 678.
109. See id. at 677–78; id. at 712 n.24 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting on other grounds).
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Appointment[s] Clause’s intent by not reserving the appointment power
in the SEC’s most politically accountable actor, the Chairman.”110 In
addition, they argued that a chairman’s authority over all executive and
administrative functions makes the chairman more than “simply a
commissioner with extra duties.”111 Rather, in practice, a chairman’s
executive powers may mean that the chairman “exerts far more control
than . . . one vote would seem to indicate,” through administrative authority
over “key personnel, internal organization, and the expenditure of funds.”112
Unsurprisingly, the Free Enterprise Fund promptly appealed to the Supreme
Court, making some of these same arguments.113
The Solicitor General’s brief on behalf of the United States pointed
out that “[a]s a body, the Commissioners exercise the same kind of final
authority that is vested in the single ‘Head’ of a traditional Cabinet
department, and the statutory provisions granting rulemaking, investigative,
and adjudicative authority uniformly vest that authority in ‘the
Commission,’ rather than its Chairman.”114 Thus, the Solicitor General
argued that “[t]reating the Commissioners as the SEC’s ‘Head’ . . . is much
more natural than saying that the SEC has no ‘Head,’ or that its ‘Head’
is a person in whom Congress has not vested the agency’s final
decisionmaking authority.”115
The Supreme Court agreed with the D.C. Circuit and Solicitor General
on this point. Specifically, the Court held that the joint Commission was
the SEC’s head for three reasons:
1. “The Commission’s [rulemaking, adjudicatory, and
investigatory] powers . . . are generally vested in the
Commissioners jointly, not the Chairman alone.” 116
2. “[T]he Chairman . . . exercises administrative and executive
functions subject to the full Commission’s policies.”117

110. See, e.g., Recent Case, supra note 24, at 2270.
111. See id. at 2271–72.
112. Id. at 2272 (quoting SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th
Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 38, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861).
114. Brief for the United States at 39, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138.
115. Id. at 40.
116. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163.
117. Id.
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3. “The Chairman is also appointed from among the
Commissioners by the President alone, which means that he
cannot be regarded as ‘the head of an agency’ for purposes
of the Reorganization Act,” which applies to agencies
operating under a “Reorganization Plan,” such as the SEC,
pursuant to that Act, 5 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.118
The Court also cited historical decisions from all three branches sanctioning
this determination.119
The Free Enterprise Fund had argued that such a conclusion would
inevitably mean that the appointment of all of the SEC’s inferior officers
were invalid because all of the agency’s officers are appointed by the
Chairman, with the approval of the Commission required for the “heads
of major . . . administrative units.”120 However, the Court disagreed and
noted that its decision did not “invalidate numerous appointments made
directly by the Chairman” because “their appointment is still made ‘subject
to the approval of the Commission,’” and based on past “precedents that
petitioners do not ask us to revisit,” “the department head’s approval
satisfies the Appointments Clause.” 121 With that, the Court’s brief
discussion was complete. But what are its implications for the many
multimember agencies currently in existence?
VI. WHO ARE THE “INFERIOR OFFICERS” AT
MULTIMEMBER AGENCIES?
Some of the earliest and most influential constitutional commentators
were befuddled regarding the scope of “inferior Officers” under the
Appointments Clause. As William Rawle wrote in 1829, “The term
‘inferior’ is somewhat vague, and it is perhaps left to congress to determine
how to apply it.”122 Likewise, Justice Joseph Story recognized that “there
does not seem to have been any exact line drawn, who are, and who are
not, to be deemed inferior officers in the sense of the constitution.”123

118. Id.
119. Id. at 3164 (citing Classification Act of 1923, ch. 265, § 2, 42 Stat. 1488; Freytag
v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 918 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)); Auth. of Civil Serv. Comm’n To Appoint a Chief Exam’r, 37 Op. Att’y Gen.
227, 231 (1933).
120. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163 n.13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. (quoting Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950 § 1(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. § 1006,
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 623 (2012)).
122. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 164 (photo. reprint 2003) (2d ed., Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin 1829).
123. STORY, supra note 18, § 1530, at 386.
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Over 100 years later, the 1949 congressional task force report simply
advised that each full board or commission retain ultimate authority for
the appointment of “bureau or division chiefs.”124 The Landis report to
President-elect Kennedy agreed.125 More recently, the DOJ has concluded
that “Officers” as described in the Appointments Clause may include
anyone occupying a continuing position that is “invested by legal authority
with a portion of the sovereign powers of the federal Government.”126
The “invested by legal authority” criterion is simple enough to
understand—official authority must be lawfully delegated. As for
“sovereign powers,” the DOJ studied the relevant case law and concluded
that these include the ability “to bind third parties, or the Government
itself, for the public benefit” by engaging in diplomatic or military functions;
controlling public funds; signing contracts or other legal instruments on
behalf of the government; or administering, executing, or interpreting the
law.127 Moreover, these powers even include the authority to plan and
carry out a limited number of commemorative events on behalf of the
federal government.128
Similarly, Kent Barnett recently surveyed the relevant Supreme Court
case law and reported that the Court has defined an “Officer of the United
States” as
“any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States” . . . . The significance of one’s authority “marks the line
between officer and nonofficer.” [D]istrict court clerks, thousands of clerks in
the executive departments, an assistant surgeon, and even a cadet-engineer
have all been deemed officers . . . . Indeed, the Court has indicated that even if
certain of an individual’s duties are ministerial, the individual’s discretionary
duties will control.129

124. See COMM’N ON ORG. OF THE EXEC. BRANCH OF THE GOV’T, supra note 37, at 47.
125. See supra text accompanying note 43.
126. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, supra note 19, at 1.
127. See id. at 12–15.
128. See, e.g., Memorandum from Martin S. Lederman, Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Acting Assistant Attorney Gen. for the Office of
Legislative Affairs, Constitutionality of the Ronald Reagan Centennial Commission Act
of 2009, at 1 (Apr. 21, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/opiniondocs/reagan
centennialcommission.pdf.
129. Kent Barnett, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Appointment with
Trouble, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1459, 1467–68 (2011) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Edmond
v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976)
(per curiam)) (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct.
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Unfortunately, the Court, like the DOJ, has thus far set forth vague,
sweeping tests devoid of much specificity. Whether one exercises
“significant authority” or “sovereign powers” is usually not clear. So
who are the inferior officers of the United States?
For the more limited purposes of this Article, it is easier to simply
look to those bureau or division chiefs who should undoubtedly qualify, as
noted by the 1948 task force and 1960 report to President-elect Kennedy.130
One easy “cheat sheet” method for identifying these inferior officers relies
upon The United States Government Manual, a somewhat obscure executive
branch publication that by regulation annually lists all “officials heading
major operating units” within agencies.131
Because the Supreme Court has concluded that inferior officers “are
officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others
who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and
consent of the Senate”132 and all of these bureau and division heads are
supervised by their presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed agency
heads, they should all be inferior officers under the Appointments Clause
and its Department Head provision. Therefore, they are ideal subjects for
the purpose of studying the appointment process at multimember agencies.
VII. FREE ENTERPRISE FUND AND CURRENT MULTIMEMBER
AGENCY APPOINTMENTS
As the attached Appendix demonstrates, there are many division chiefs,
bureau heads, and other inferior officers at multimember agencies who
are appointed solely by the chairman of a multimember board or
commission.
For example, although certain named officers are approved by the full
Consumer Product Safety Commission after nomination by the
Chairman, 133 that agency’s Chairman appoints any “other officers.”134
Likewise, at the Export-Import Bank, the Board appoints most officers,135
but the President of the Bank—equivalent to its Chairman—directly
appoints a senior vice president who manages the Small Business
Division.136 Similarly, the Chairman of the NRC unilaterally appoints

3138, 3179 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82
(1991)).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 124–25.
131. 1 C.F.R. § 9.2(a)(3) (2013).
132. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 2053(g)(1) (2006).
134. Id. § 2053(g)(2).
135. See 12 U.S.C. § 635A(c)(7) (2012).
136. Id. § 635A(f)(2).
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the directors of that agency’s Office of Congressional Relations and Office
of Public Affairs,137 even though the Commission must approve the
Chairman’s nominees to head a number of other offices.138
Strangely, the NRC Chairman is also “responsible for . . . appointing
and removing without any further action by the Commission, all [other]
officers” but by statute must delegate this responsibility to the agency’s
Executive Director for Operations, an inferior officer appointed and
supervised by the Commission.139 As a result, the Executive Director for
Operations appoints and supervises a number of inferior officers, including
three Deputy Executive Directors. All of these Deputy Executive Directors
supervise agency office directors, and two of them supervise the
performance of officers whose appointments are confirmed by the
Commission, such as the Directors of the Offices of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation and Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.140 Unsurprisingly,
this very legally dubious arrangement appears to be unique within the
federal government.
The situation is much more straightforward at the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission,141 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,142
Merit Systems Protection Board,143 National Transportation Safety
Board,144 and Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,145
where the chairmen simply appoint and remove all officers. Similarly, the
Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) appoints all office
directors at that agency “but only after consultation with the other
Commissioners,” who have no apparent authority to approve or disapprove
these appointments.146 And finally, the Chairman of the International
Trade Commission (ITC) has statutory authority to appoint all agency
137. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980 § 2(a), 45 Fed. Reg. 40,561 (June 16, 1980),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 737 (2012).
138. See id. § 1(b).
139. Id. § 2(b).
140. See id. §§ 1(b)(2), 2(b); see also U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: The
Commission, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMMISSION (Aug. 25, 2013), http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/organization/nrcorg.pdf (outlining the organization).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2006).
142. Id. § 7171(c).
143. 5 U.S.C. § 1204(j) (2012).
144. 49 U.S.C. § 1111(e)(1), (h) (2006).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 661(e) (2006).
146. 46 U.S.C. § 301(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2006); see also id. § 301(c)(3)(A)(i) (providing
the Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission with authority to appoint all other
officers at the agency).

271

officers unless a majority of the Commission votes to disapprove those
appointments.147 This arrangement effectively gives the Chairman a tiebreaking power—a 1–1 or 2–2 vote results in the appointment of an officer
nominated by the Chairman. On the other hand, the ITC Chairman may
remove officers only when a majority of the Commission affirmatively
votes to approve such action.148
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund,
what do we make of all these appointments that are currently made without
full board or commission approval? Who are the heads of these agencies
for Appointments Clause purposes?
Applying the Court’s criteria, in each case, the agencies’ respective
boards or commissions—all properly consisting of presidential
appointees149—hold all adjudicatory, rulemaking, and investigatory
authorities.150 In addition, recall that the default position, as recognized
by the DOJ, is that the respective boards are the highest authorities in
multimember agencies.151
Furthermore, none of the relevant statutes state that the respective
chairmen are not bound by their full boards’ or commissions’ policies,
and the chairmen of the Consumer Product Safety Commission,152 FMC,153
NRC,154 and National Transportation Safety Board155 are explicitly required
to follow the general policies set by their respective boards or commissions.
Moreover, the NRC is governed by a Reorganization Plan,156 so under the
Reorganization Act, the “head of [that] agency”157 cannot be its Chairman,
who is selected by the President alone.158
The only alternative theory justifying the current arrangement requires
a conclusion that multimember agencies have multiple heads for different
purposes—perhaps the chairman would act as the head when appointing
147. 19 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(1) (2006).
148. Id. § 1331(a)(2)(A).
149. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (concluding that “‘the
Heads of Departments’ [must be] themselves Presidential appointees” (quoting U.S. CONST.
art II, § 2)).
150. See infra Appendix (listing authorities for each multimember agency).
151. See supra notes 102, 104 and accompanying text.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 2053(f)(2) (2006).
153. 46 U.S.C. § 301(c)(2) (2006).
154. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980 § 2(c), 45 Fed. Reg. 40,563 (June 16, 1980),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 737–38 (2012).
155. 49 U.S.C. § 1111(e) (2006).
156. See Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980 § 1(a), 45 Fed. Reg. 40,561 (June 16,
1980), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 737.
157. See 5 U.S.C. § 904 (2012); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 (2010) (discussing application of the Reorganization
Act).
158. See 42 U.S.C. § 5841(a)(1) (2006).
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some inferior officers, and the board or commission would act as the head
when appointing others. But it would be difficult to imagine how such a
bizarre, hydra-like arrangement could effectively function. For example,
how would anyone determine who was the head for the purposes of various
statutes? And who would ultimately command agency staff? Whose orders
would the staff and regulated entities follow in the event of a conflict—
the chairman or the board? Even the Free Enterprise Fund did not anticipate
such a holding, arguing that there should be only “one” head—the
chairman, in its opinion.159 Thus, the Supreme Court’s recently announced
criteria clearly point to the conclusion that the constitutional heads of
these multimember agencies, as currently structured, cannot be their
chairmen but must be their full boards or commissions, acting jointly.
VIII. WHAT ABOUT THE “APPROBATION RULE” AND
REMOVAL POWERS?
One last defense of some mixed, hydra-like appointment authorities
might be the Supreme Court’s old “approbation rule,” which has been
interpreted to “permit[] a department head to approve a subordinate’s
appointment of an inferior officer,” although it “applies [only] to situations
in which the statute expressly requires the department head to approve
the appointment.”160 This rule is followed in many multimember agency
appointments, by providing that the full board or commission must vote
to approve the chairman’s “nominees” for those positions.161
Some scholars have argued that these longstanding practices of the
executive and legislative branches deserve to be accorded some interpretive
deference when considering the limits of the Appointments Clause.162
This position would hold that the Free Enterprise Fund Court cannot
have intended, in such a brief discussion toward the end of the opinion,
to implicitly order Congress to rewrite scores of statutory appointment
provisions that have been in place for decades.

159. Brief for Petitioners at 60, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138.
160. Barnett, supra note 129, at 1481 n.159 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing United States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525, 532–33 (1888); United States v. Hartwell,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393–94 (1868)).
161. See infra Appendix.
162. See, e.g., Note, Congressional Restrictions on the President’s Appointment Power
and the Role of Longstanding Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 1914, 1927–35 (2007).
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Although this argument has the advantages of “stability and practicality,”
Hanah Volokh has argued sensibly that “a long history of violating the
Constitution does not make continuing violations acceptable. Acquiescence
in a practice believed to be unconstitutional can only be reasonable if
there is a good argument that the practice is in fact constitutional.”163
Although the Free Enterprise Fund decision cited the approbation rule
and its foundation in much earlier cases from the nineteenth century, the
Court obliquely questioned the validity of this theory by simply noting that
these old cases were “precedents that petitioners do not ask us to revisit,”164
rather than offering any sort of reaffirmation or endorsement of the rule.
In fact, in its reply brief before the Court, the Free Enterprise Fund
attempted to brush aside the significance of the approbation rule by simply
pointing out that “as Senate confirmation hearings demonstrate, approval
is fundamentally different than appointment, and results in different officers
being selected.”165 The fund was undoubtedly correct.
The Senate would surely confirm different officers if it could both
nominate and approve them, rather than simply approving presidential
nominees.166 Likewise, if any SEC Commissioner could “nominate” an
inferior officer for approval by the Commission majority, the Commission
would probably select some different officers than those it approved from
the more limited pool of nominees acceptable to the agency’s Chairman.167
Moreover, it is manifestly unclear how inferior officers could be removed
under the approbation rule. If an inferior officer is appointed through full
board or commission approval after nomination by the chairman, how is
the officer removed? May any commissioner or board member call for a
vote on the removal of one of these officers? Or may only the chairman
initiate removals, just as only the chairman may initiate appointments?
For example, the General Counsel of the ITC once advised,
While the commission majority can nullify the chairman’s decisions, only the
chairman can initiate administrative actions. The . . . statute does not permit other
commissioners, nor a commission majority, to initiate a purely administrative

163. Volokh, supra note 13, at 774.
164. See supra text accompanying note 121.
165. Reply Brief at 27, Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861).
166. Does anyone think that the Senate of the 102d Congress, containing fiftyseven Democrats at the time, would have nominated Clarence Thomas to fill Thurgood
Marshall’s seat on the Supreme Court, even though it narrowly approved his nomination
by President George H.W. Bush?
167. See, e.g., U.S. G EN . A CCOUNTING O FFICE , GAO-03-339, S ECURITIES AND
E XCHANGE COMMISSION: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING
OVERSIGHT BOARD SELECTION PROCESS 10 (2002) (reporting that some SEC Commissioners
felt “that their vote was irrelevant” in the current nomination process).
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decision. A commission majority can only block a chairman and not substitute
its own decision for the chairman’s decision.168

Under that vision, the approbation model clearly does not satisfy
Justice Scalia’s theory of the Appointments Clause, which imagines that
“those officers appointed by the President with Senate approval could on
their own appoint their subordinates.”169 In the case of many agencies,
the full boards or commissions, full of Senate-confirmed officers, cannot
initiate and appoint subordinates on their own, as they must wait for the
chairman to nominate a candidate acceptable to them. It is difficult to
see the political accountability or good governance principles in a system
whereby a single chairman can block appointments or removals favored
by every other commissioner or board member by simply refusing to
initiate the process. Where is the collegial decisionmaking that is the alleged
raison d’être of multimember agencies? In other words, perhaps this model
deserves closer constitutional scrutiny than it has previously received.
Notwithstanding these potential flaws in the approbation theory, even
when applied as is, the FMC’s limited “authority” to “consult” with its
Chairman on appointments170 and the ITC’s limited power to affirmatively
block the Chairman’s nominees171 do not seem to pass constitutional
muster. In sum, after Free Enterprise Fund, the only clearly constitutional
inferior officer appointments at multimember agencies are those initiated
and approved by the full board or commission, such as those at the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation172 and National Labor Relations Board.173
However, most multimember agency appointment schemes do not follow
this model.
IX. DEALING WITH THE EFFECTS OF FREE ENTERPRISE FUND
As Kent Barnett has noted, “An inferior officer’s appointment . . . may
seem inconsequential. But an invalid appointment could, depending on
the [officer’s] duties, lead to unnecessary, time-consuming litigation and
168. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-92-45, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION: ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY IS AMBIGUOUS 16 (1992).
169. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 720–21 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
170. See 46 U.S.C. § 301(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2006); id. § 301(c)(3)(A)(i); supra text
accompanying note 146.
171. See 19 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(1) (2012); supra text accompanying note 147.
172. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a) (2006).
173. 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006).
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perhaps even the invalidation of agency actions.”174 For example, the
Supreme Court has held that “one who makes a timely challenge to the
constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates
his case is entitled to a decision on the merits of the question and
whatever relief may be appropriate if a violation indeed occurred,” such
as a new hearing “before a properly appointed” adjudicator.175 Thus,
“most matters in which the [improperly appointed officer] may participate—
such as rulemaking, adjudicatory matters, and enforcement proceedings—
would likely be called into question and perhaps even invalidated.”176
After all, “[i]f the remedy is not invalidation, it is difficult to see what
impetus Congress or the President has to establish proper appointments.”177
Alternatively, perhaps a court would simply find that the improperly
appointed inferior officers may be appointed and removed at the discretion
of the full board or commission at each respective agency. In Free
Enterprise Fund, for example, the Supreme Court noted that “‘when
confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution
to the problem,’ severing any ‘problematic portions while leaving the
remainder intact.’”178
Thus, in Free Enterprise Fund, the Solicitor General argued that if the
Chairman was truly the “‘Head’ of the SEC . . . . [C]anons of constitutional
avoidance would then dictate that [any] statutory grant of appointment
authority to ‘the Commission’ be deemed a grant to its ‘Head,’ the
Chairman.”179 Presumably, the reverse result could also be true—any
appointment authorities unconstitutionally vested in a multimember agency
chairman could be deemed granted to the board or commission, such that
the board or commission could act to appoint and remove or reassign
inferior officers from that point forward, without further legislation or
litigation.180
Otherwise, if Congress would still like the respective chairmen of the
various multimember agencies to retain any appointment and removal
174. Barnett, supra note 129, at 1460.
175. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182–83, 188 (1995).
176. Barnett, supra note 129, at 1481.
177. Id. at 1483–84.
178. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161
(2010) (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328–
29 (2006)); see also Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d
1332, 1334, 1336–37, 1440–41 (D.C. Cir. 2012), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, No.
11-1083 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 28, 2012) (striking unconstitutional restrictions on appointment
and removal of Copyright Royalty Board members at the Library of Congress but leaving all
other statutory provisions intact).
179. Brief for the United States, supra note 114, at 42 n.14.
180. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161 (“Under the traditional default rule,
removal is incident to the power of appointment.”).
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powers over the inferior officers in those agencies, it is free to amend the
authorizing statutes to provide for that181 because as presidential appointees,
chairmen may function as agency heads.182 For instance, following the
Court’s criteria set forth in Free Enterprise Fund, Congress could amend
the relevant statutes to place final rulemaking, adjudicatory, and
investigatory power in the chairmen—perhaps after consulting with the
other board or commission members—and make clear that the chairmen’s
appointment decisions are not subject to the general policies set forth by
their full boards or commissions.183 This would provide a way to maintain a
board or commission form while making clear that the chairmen are the
heads of the agencies. Alternatively, as a kind of stopgap measure, perhaps
the current boards and commissions could freely choose to ratify the
appointments of their inferior office holders after the fact.
Regardless, as one former commissioner testified to Congress, it is
clear that confusing combinations of chairman and board or commission
authority are “unworkable.”184 Within the realm of inferior officer
appointments, it “simply makes no sense to divide the senior officers of
the staff into some appointed and removed by the Commission and
others appointed and removed only by the Chairman.”185 Another former
commissioner agreed that “[o]ne cannot compensate for the absence of a
clear majority” in favor of taking certain actions “by changing the law to
allow the Chairman to shape the agency,” through appointments or
otherwise, “to suit his position even if he is in a minority. . . . [T]he basic
authority and tone of the agency and its top employees [must] come from a
majority of the Commission.”186
In sum, as a matter of policy and law, it seems clear that an agency
should either be led by one strong administrator who is solely responsible
for appointing and removing or reassigning the subordinate officials or
the agency and all of its inferior officer appointments, removals, and
181. See id. at 3162 (suggesting that “editorial freedom . . . belongs to the Legislature”
and that “Congress of course remains free to pursue” options restoring the constitutionality of
its prior system of appointments).
182. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997).
183. See Brief for the United States, supra note 114, at 39–40; supra text accompanying
note 115.
184. See Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980, supra note 89, at 72 (statement of Victor
Gilinsky, Comm’r, Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n).
185. Id. at 80 (statement of Joseph M. Hendrie, Comm’r, Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n).
186. Id. at 75 (statement of Peter A. Bradford, Comm’r, Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n).
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reassignments should be directed by a full board or commission, acting
jointly through a majority of its members. After the Supreme Court’s
decision in Free Enterprise Fund, the alternative mixed structure in place
at many multimember agencies is not only unwise but potentially
unconstitutional. And even if the world is not falling apart yet,
constitutional flaws, by definition, are not matters to be taken lightly.
Congress may therefore wish to take action to remedy these questionable
agency appointment provisions, as it jumped to correct the newly identified
constitutional flaws in the appointment of administrative patent judges.187
Such action would also be consistent with section 989B of the recent
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which
for the first time clarified that the “head of the entity” for the purposes of
supervising the inspectors general in twenty-six multimember agencies
covered by the Inspector General Act is “the board or commission of the
. . . entity,” rather than the chairmen of those agencies, as the Act had
generally been interpreted in the past.188 In light of the issues identified
above, this was a big step in the right direction.
Perhaps Congress now has its eyes open to other potential agency
appointment issues lurking within the U.S. Code.189 If so, this Article
hopefully presents one more opportunity to correct some constitutionally
troubling statutory provisions and continue the pattern of clarifying
collective board and commission authorities at multimember agencies.

187. Congress acted quickly in that situation, and perhaps it could do so here as
well. See Act of Aug. 12, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-313, § 1(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3014, 3014
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 6 (Supp. II 2009)) (remedying constitutional flaw in appointment of
patent judges by officers who were not “Heads of Departments,” as identified in John F.
Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904,
919–20 (2009)).
188. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1945 (2010); see also 2008 and 2009
List of Designated Federal Entities and Federal Entities, 74 Fed. Reg. 3656 (Jan. 21,
2009) (final Office of Management and Budget notice before passage of the Dodd-Frank Act,
listing the respective chairmen as the supervisory heads of most multimember entities).
189. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, The Chief Justice, the Appointment of Inferior
Officers, and the ‘Court of Law’ Requirement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1125 (2013) (arguing
persuasively that the Supreme Court acting jointly, rather than the Chief Justice acting
unilaterally, should possess appointment authority under the Appointments Clause).
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(Eoard s~ts
governing
bvlaws\.
Unciell

(Pl'ina)[e]
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Agency

Chairman
Selectoo ty
President Alone?
(for
Reorga,i zation

Pta.,sl f],1
Federal
Commuru cations
Commission
(FCC)

All o'licer;

Yes

Ye!

47U.S.C.
§ 154(1)'. l)
(20(<,).

47U.S.C.
§ 154(1)
(rulemalcng and
ad,1 ucication),
47U.S.C.
§ 154(3Xl), 0),
(o), 47 U.S.C.
§ 40~(2•),)6)
(investiRati on).

r:41
Yes, after
Cha:rrnen
nominates

Unclear

47U.S.C.
j 155(e)
(2C,Co).

Federal De~osll
lnrnrance
Corporation
(FDIC)
[:6]

All o'licer;

Yes

Ye,;

12U.S.C.
j 1819(a)
(2( 12).

Yes:
12 l.SC .
§ 1s 12,:2)
(2012).

2USC
j 4370:0
(2C, 12).

Yes:
2 u.s.c.
§ 437c(a)
(2012).

Federal Eiecbon
Commission
(FEC)
[: • ]

0

General

CounseL
Staff
Director,

o:hers

Yes

Yes

Yes:
12U.S.C.
§ i819(a)(2) i2)
(rulemak:ng,
investiga:io:i.,
and exe:-cise 311
oowers).
Yes:
2 U s.c.
§ m c(a) ,:2c,12J
(investigati on,
rulemaking, and
ad1ucication)
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Managi ng
Director

The Chairman or the Board?

FCC
[:5]

284
Agency

Inferior
O fficer [a]

A ppointcd by
Board?
[bl

Removed
by Boa:-d?
[c)

Source of
Appointmen'.
Au thority [d]

App:ii.ntmcnt o f
Board Requires
Senate
Coru1nnation?
(f'r/111:) [e]

Chainnan
Subject to
Board
Policies?
[fj

Federal
Maritime
Commission
(FMC)
[18]

A ll
officer.;

No
Chairm an ,
after ·•consult''
for m aj or
organization
heads

Unclear

46U .S.C.
~ 30 1(c)(3)
(2005).

Yes:
46 L·.s.c.
§ 30 1(b)( l )
(2006).

46 u .s.c.
§ 301(c)(2)

Yes:

(2006).

RuJ emaklng,
Adjudicatory,
and
lnvestiiz;atoiy
Authority
Vested in
Board? r~l
Yes:
46 u .s.c.
§ 306 (2006),
46U .S.C.
§ 4050I(gX l )
(2006)
(rnlemaking);
41 u .s.c.
§ 304 (2 006)
(orders):
41 U.S.C.
§ 30l (c)(2)
(2006)
(regulatory
decision s):
46U .S.C.
§ 40103 (2006)
(exemptions);
46 U.S.C.
§ 40104 (2006)
(in vestigation);
46 U.S.C.
§ 40704 (2006)
(rates);
46 u .s.c.
§ 40901 (2006)
(licensinl't ).

Chairman
Selected by
President Alone?
(for
Reorgani:zation
Plans) [h)

Federal
Reserve
[1 9]

Inferior
Of:'icer [a]

All
officers

Federal
All
officers
Energy
Regul atcry
Commission
(FERC:,
[20]

Ret110·1ed

[b]

:cJ

Yes

Yes

Source of
Appointment
Authority (d]

Ai:ix-intment of
Board Requires
Senate
Confirrnatio:1?
(Print:) [e]

Chainnan
Sutject to
Board
Fclicies?
[:]

12 U.S.C.
§ 248(1)
(2012).

Yes:
12 U s.c. § 242
(2012).

Yes:

No:
Chairmm

l\o:
O,airman

i.2U.S.C.
§ 717l(c)
(200c).

Yes:
42 US C
§ i171 (b)
(2006).

Yes

Yes

5C.S.C.
§ 7105(d)
(2012).

Yes:
5 U.S.::.
§ iJ0i.(b)
(20 12).

12 u.s.c.
§ 242
(2012).
Unclea:-

Unclea:-

Rulernakin~.
.'\cj udicatory,

and
Investigatory
At:.tltorit/
Vested in
Board? [gl
Yes:
12US.C.
§ 2A8 (2012)
(generallv).
Yes:
42U.S.C.
-~'i 171(g)
(2006)
(investigation);
42 U S.C.
§ 'i 172 (2006)
(licensi:ig,
en:'orcernent,
and
rulernakin2 ).
Yes:
5 U S.C.
§ 'i l05(a)(2;,
(g) (20 12).

Chainnan
Selected by
President Alone?
(for
Reorgani zation
Plans) [h)
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All
officers

·Jy Board?

The Chairman or the Board?

Federal
Labor
Relations
!\ i:faorit/
(FLRA"!
[2:l

Appointed
by 3oard?
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Agency

286

Agency

Inferi or
O:licer [a)

Appointed
ty 3oa:d?
[b)

Rer.ioved
by Board\
[c]

Sow-ce of
Appo intmrn
Authority [d)

Appointment ~f
Board Requires
Senate
Confurnation?
(P,ir.r:;, [e]

Chaim.an
Subjec: to
Board
Policie,?
(fl

R·.tlemaking,
Adjudicatcrf,
and In,estigatocy
Authority Vested
in Boarc? [g]

Yes:
30 l.S.C.
§ 823'.d; (2CCt)
(adj udicarion and
rulermking1
30 l.S.C.
§ 823(e) (2006)
(inveSl!.l\ation).
Yes:
5C.S.C.
§ 8472(0:J)
(2012) (:ules);
5C .S.C.
§ 8472f_gl( l)(B)
(2012) (dire:t
staff action
regarding nil es,
investigati ons, et
cetera).
5 C.S.C. §8475
(2012) (set
oolicies \

Chairman
Selected by
Pres1cent Alone?
(for

Reorganizatcr.
Plans) fhl

Federal
All
Mine Safety office:.
and Health
Revie""
Commis,ion
(FMSHRC)
[22)
Federal
Retirement
Thri ft
lnvesnnent
Board
(FRTIB)
[23)

Executive
Directer

Yes

Yes

30U.S.C.
§ 823(b)(2)
(2006 ).

Yes:
30U.S.C.
§ 823(a) (2006).

Un:lear

Yes

Yes

5U.S.C.
§ 8472(gXl)(Cl
(20 12) (removal);
5U.S.C.
§ 8474(a)(I)
(2012 )
(appointment).

Yes:
5U.S.C.
§ 8472(b)
(20 12).

Un:lear

Fed=!
Trade
C0mmis~ion
(TT::)
[24]

Appointed
by Board?
[b)

Re:r.cved
bv Beard•

All o:'fic,r3
headinb
major
administrative
u.,its

Yes, atler
:::hairrnan

LJnC:ear

All o:'fic,r3

l\c:
::hainnan,
u,1ies1

No:

Commission
:IJsappro,·es

Comm:ss~cm

[~]

nC1mi.n.ates

Chai1111~ ,
after
approves

Appointment of
Board Require,
Senete
Conlk nmion•
(Printz) [e)

Chairman
Subjeci lo
Board
Polici es? [I]

Rule:r.aking,
Adjudicitory,
and
lnvasti~atory
Authori~I
Vested in
Board?r~l

Roo,garu,ation
Plan No. 8 of
19~C• § l(b)(2),
3 :::.F.R. 1005
(194~-1953),
reprj11ted in l 5
U s.c. § 41
(2012).

Yes:

Yes:
Reorganization
Plan No. 8 of
1950 § l(b)(I),
3 :: FRIOC•5
(1949-195 3),
rop,·:ni,J in 15
U S.C. § 41
(2012).

Yes:

Y~:

15 u.s.c. § ,16
(2012), 15
U.S.C. j 49
(Z.:,12)
(in,·estigarion);
15 u.s.c. § 45
(2012), 15
U.S.C. j 53
(2012)
(adjudicabcn);
15 u.s.c.
~ 57a :20 1,)
(rulemakin~).
Yes:
19 u.s.c.
~ 1332 (2012)
(uwestigarion);
19U.S.C.
~ 1335 (2012)
(rulemaking);
19 u.s.c.
S 133? (2012)
(adiudi~ton)

Reorganization
Plan No. 8 of
1;sop, 3
C.F.R. 1005
(1 949-1953),
reprint<d Ir. 15
U.S.C. }41
(2,)12).

19 :J.S.C.
§ 1331 (8)
(20 12).

15 u.s.c. § 41
(2012).

Yes:

l9 U. S.C.
1330(8)
(2012).

*

U~clear

Chainna,
Selected by
President Alone?
(for
ReorgMization
Plans)[h]
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Source of
A?pointment
A·Jtt.cnty (di

The Chairman or the Board?

International
Trade
CcmmiM:ion
(ITC)
(25)

Inferior
:)fficor [a)
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Agency

288
Agency

Inferior
Officer [a:

Source of
Appointment
Autr.ority [d]

AHointment of
Board Requ.:res
Se:ia:e
Coofinna:im1?
(Printz) [e]

Chairman
Subject to
Board
Policies?
[f]

Ru1 enaki ng,
Adiudicctory,
anc Investigatcry
Authori :y \' es ted
in Bo;ird? [g)

No:
Chairman

5U.S.C.
§ 12040)
(2012).

Yes:
5 U.S C. § 1201
(20 12).

Unclear

·yes

12 U.S.C.
§ l766(i)'. 1)
(2012); 12
US.C.
§ l766GX l)
(2Dl2)

Yes:
l 2U.S.C.
§ 1752a(I:)
(20 12).

Yes:
12U.S.C.
§ 1752a(d)
(2012).

~es:
5 I..:.S.C.
§ 1204(a) (2012)
(adjudication);
5 l.S.C.
§ 1204(eX2XB)
(2012), 5 U SC.
§ 1204(.1) (2:ll2)
(rules);
5U.S.C.
§ 1204(aX3)
(2012), 5 u.s.c.
§ (e:(3) (2012)
(investigation).
Ves:
12 U.S.C. § 1766
(2012)
(rulena<1ng,
adjudication, and
inve,tigalion).

Appo:nted

Removed

ty Bead?

by Boar:!?

[b]

[c]

Merit Systems All
Protection
officers
Boarc (MSPB)
[26]

No:
Chair:nan

Natio:1i
All
Credi: Cnion
officers
Administration
(NCCA)
[27]

Yes

Chainnan
Selectoo by
Pres ident Alone~
(for
Reorga,"lization
Plans)fhl

Inferior
Officer [a]

Appointed
by Board?

Removed
by Boarc:?

[b]

[c]

Souroe of
Appomtment
Authority [d]

I

Appointme:ii of
Board Requires
Senate
Confirmation?
(Prinrz) [e]

Chainnan
Subject to
Beard
Policies?
[f]

Yes

Yes

29U.S.C.
§ 154(a)
(2006).

Yes:
29U.S .C.
§ 153(a) (2006).

1.:nclear

\ational
\-!ediatior.
Beard
,J'1MB)
)9]

All
officers

Yes

Yes

~5 U. S.C.
§ 154 (2006).

Yes:
45 U.S.C. § 154
(2C<l6}

1.:nclear

artitrator);
45U .S.C.
§ 156 (2006)
(rulemakine:'i.

(for
Recrganization
Plans) [t.]

289

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

All
officers

Chainnan
Selected by
President Alone?

The Chairman or the Board?

\ational
Labor
Relations
Board
,)JLRB)
)8]

Ru! emaking,
Adjudirnto:y,
and
lr.vestigato:y
Authority
Vested :n
Board• re:1
Yes:
29U .S.C.
§ 156 (2006)
(rulemaking);
29U .S.C.
§ 155 (2006),
29U.S.C.
§ 161 (2006}
(investigation);
29U.S.C.
§ 160 (2006)
(adiudication',_
Yes:
45U.S.C.
§ 155 (2006}
(r.ame
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Ager.cy
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Agency

lnferior Officer
[a]

Appoin:ed
by Board?
[b]

Rem,Y1ed by
EoartP

(C:

Source of
Appointment
Authority [d]

A,pointment of
Board ~eq uires
Senate
Confumation?
(Prinrz) [(

Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission
(NRC)
[3C]

General
Counsel,
Exec:Jlive
Director,

Yes, all:er
:::hairman
nomina:es

Yes, after any
Commissioner
nominates

Re;:irganization
Plw l of 1980
§ l(b), 45 Fed.
Re; 4)561
(Mar. 27,
1980).

1'o:
:::hairman

No:
Chcirman

Re;:irganization
Plw I of 198(1
§2(a), 45 Foo
Re; 4)561
(Mar. 27,
1980).

Secret;u-y,

Adm:nislrative
Judges, Chief
FLnancial
Officer,

NRC
131]

Depur1 Chief
Financial
Officer, various
office directors
Public Affair.,,
Congres~i0nal
Affam

Yes:
L2 U.3.C.
§ 5841 '.aXl)
(2006).

Chai:man
Subject to
Boar:l
Fol icies? [ij

R.tlemaking,
AiiudiC3tbn,
and
Investigatory
Authority
'hstedin
Boarc? fi;l
Yes:
Yes:
Reo15an.izaticn Reorganization
Flan 1 of l981) Plan : of1980
§ 2(c), 45 Fed. ~ l(a;, 45 Fed.
Reg. 40Scl
Reg. 4056 1
(~ar. 27,
(Mar. 27,
1980).
1980);
42 c.s.c
~ 220\(c)
(2006)

Chairman
Selectei by
President Alone?
(for
Rooigaru 22twr.
Plaru) lh]
Yes:
42 U. S.C.
§ 5&4 l(a)(:)
(2,),)6).

Infericr
Officer [a]

Appointed
by Board?
[b)

Remcved
by Boan!?

[c]

N RC

Various

No:

No

[32)

oifice
direcwrs

Executive

Executive

All
oificers

Director,

supertised

by
Chainnm

by
Chai1111an

No:
Chainnm

No
Chaim,an

Appointme111
of Board
Require,
Senate
Confinnatio<1?
(?,·ir.lz) [e]

Cliainnan
Subject to
Board
Policies?
[f]

Rulemaldng,
A djudicatcry,
and
lnvestigatcry
A uthcrity
Vested ill
Board? llll

49 u.s.c.

Yes:

§ 111 l(e)( 1)

49U.SC.
§ l l l l (b)
(2()06).

Yes:
49U S.C.

Yes:
49 u.s c.
§§ 111 3(1),
11 lt(bX3)
(2 005) (rule,);
49 U.S C.
§§ 111 3(a), ( e),
11 l«b)(l)
(2005)
(111vestigatio r1 ).

Reorg:mizatiOll
Plan I of l 980
§ 2(bX4), 45
Fed. Reg.
4056 1 (Mar.
27, 1930);
5 U.S. C.
§ 1401 (20 ]2)
(Chief Hu man
Capital
Officer);
44 U.S .C.
§ 35C6(a)(2)(A)
(2006) (Chief
Infonnation
Officer'.

(2006).

[34)

Ouof
Fmancial
Officer

No:
Chainmn

No
Chainuan

49 U.S .C.
§ llll(h)
(2006).

~

l l l l (e)

(2006).
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f33l
NTSB

Chairman
Selected by
Pres,dent
Alone? (for
Reorganization
Plans) [h]

The Chairman or the Board?

National
Transportaticn
S aJety Board
(NTSB)

Director,

supervised

Source o f
Appcintrnent
Authority [d)
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Agency

292
Agency

Inferior
omcec[a]

Appointed
by Board?
[b]

Removed
by Board?
[~]

Source of
Appointmen t
Autho n ty
[di

O:;cupation a:
Safety and
Health
Review
Con;unissi o n
(OS HRC)
[35)

All
o fficers

No ;
C h airman

No;
Chairman

29 t.:.S. C.
§ 66 l (e)
(2006),

Pos tal
Regul atory
Commission
(PRC)
(36]

All
c ffioers

No :
C h ainnan,
with
Comtnission
a pprov21 for
major

Un~lear

39 t.:. s. c.
§ 504(a)(l)
(2006).

Yes

45 t.:. S.C.
§ 23 1f(b)(9 )
(2006),

App ointment
of Board
Require,
Senate
Confirmation?
(PrinlZ) [e]

Chairman
S ub ject to
Board
Policies?

Yes;

Unclear

111

29 U . S.C.
§66l (a)
(2005)

Yes :
39 U . S .C.
§ 502 (a)
(2005)

Yes:
39 U .S .C.
§ 504(b)
(2006)

Yes :

Unclear

organi :l3.tion

heads

Railroad
Retiremen:
Board
(37)

All
o fficers

Yes

45 u.s.c.
§ 231 f(a)
(2005)

Rulemaki ng,
Adj udicatory,
and
Jnvestigatory
Authority
Vested in
Board? ri>:l
Yes;
29 U.S .C .
§ 66 ! (g)
(2006) (rules);
29 u.s.c.
§ 66 1 ,),}-(i )
(2006)
(investigation) ,
29 u.s.c.
§ 659(c)
(2006)
(a diudication ).
Yes:
39 U . S .C.
§ 503 (2006)
(nllesiactio:n) ;
J9U.S.C§ 504(0
(2006)
(approve
Chabr.an
su bpoenas)
Yes;

45

u .s.c.

§ 23 l f(b)

(2006) (all
powers).

Chamnan
Selected by
President
Alone? (for
Reorganiza tion
Plans) [h]

Inferior
Cfficer [a]

Appo:nted by
Boan: ?

by Board?

(b]

[c]

Removed

Source o:
A~pcinuc,enl
Authority [(

Appointment
ofBoard
Recuires
Senate

Chair.na,

Subject to
Boarc
Policies• [tl

Confimation•
(P,·ir.tz) [e]
Securities
and
E~change
Conuni ssi on
(SEC)

At: officers

(38]

No:
Chairrnui~
wi th
Co:rn:ussion
approval for
major

Cnclear

Yes:
15U.S.C.
§ 78d(a)
(2•) 12).

39 u.s.c.

Yes :
39U.S.C.
§ 202(aX l)
(2•)06) :except
Postmaster
Genera and

aCJT11 nist.rarive

United
Slates
Postal
Service
(US?S)
[39]
USFS
(4C,]

Cfficer,

Chief Postal
Inspector

units
Yos

Yes

§ :02(c)-(e)
,:2006).

Reorganization
Plan No Jo)of
1950 § l(b)(l),
15 f'e:I Reg.
3 175 '. May 24,
1950).
LJ n-~lear

Yes:
Re-0rgaruzation
Plan No. 10 of
1950 p , 15
Fed. Reg. 317 5
(\(ay24,
1950).

Yes

39U.S.C.
9202(a)(l)
(2006) (al l
powen).

Deputy
No:
Postmaster
General, one
member of
Boarc'

No:
Posunaster
General,
one
membor of
foard

39U.S.C.
§ ,C'-'1 (2006).

Postmaster
Genera).
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Po,lmastor
General,
Ceputy
Po,lmastor
General,
Insp,ctor
Genernl
General
Counsol,
Assistant
Postmasters
Genern!,
Judicial

v..:

Chairman
Selecte:I by
President
Alone? (for
Re-0rgaruzation
Plans) [h]

The Chairman or the Board?

Reorg an.izmi.an
Plan Ne. IC of
1950 ~ l (bX2),
15 f'eri. Reg
3175 (May 24,
1950).

~ulemak:ng,
Adj udica1ory,
and
:m estii;atory
Authority
Ves:ed in
3oard? fi:l
Yes
15 U.S.C. § ?8w
(2012) (r.i!es);
15 LJ .S.C. § ?8u
(201 2)
(investigation
and
adjudication'.
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